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Dimensions of Political Representation: Ideological 
and Policy Congruence between the Representative 
and the Represented in Seven Countries 
Yilmaz Esmer & Bahar Ayça Okçuoğlu ∗ 
Abstract: »Dimensionen der politischen Vertretung: Ideologie- und Politikkon-
gruenz zwischen Abgeordneten und Wählerschaft in sieben Ländern«. Based on 
the understanding that modern democracies must be representative and that 
this is not only necessary but also desirable, this paper exploits a unique data 
set which makes comparisons of citizens and their parliamentary representa-
tives on a number of dimensions possible at two points in time (roughly six 
years apart). The data allows us to comparatively evaluate three dimensions of 
congruence: ideology, economic policy, and democratic values. We have found 
that the levels of congruence for the first two dimensions is remarkably high 
while the popular demand for democracy is significantly lagging behind. Final-
ly, we have failed to demonstrate a positive correlation between quality of de-
mocracy and levels of congruence. 
Keywords: Political elites, representation, trustee model, imperative mandate, 
elite-mass congruence, Left-Right ideology. 
 
Political representation is at the core of liberal democracy.1 
1.  Introduction 
Although the study of and particularly empirical research on political represen-
tation in modern democracies is, by definition, relatively recent, recognition of 
the problem by political thinkers goes all the way back to Aristotle. Indeed, 
what the great philosopher wrote over 23 centuries ago is still pertinent: 
A democracy will do well to apply this plan of compulsory attendance to the 
deliberative assembly. The results of deliberation are better when all deliber-
ate together; when the populace is mixed with the notables and they, in their 
turn, with the populace. It is also in the interest of democracy that the parts of 
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the state should be represented in the deliberative body by an equal number of 
members, either elected for the purpose or appointed by the use of the lot.  
(Aristotle 1962 [330 B.C.], 192)  
As explained by Barker (1962, note 2)  
It is important to notice that Aristotle here suggests a representative [emphasis 
original] organ of deliberation […]. This shows that the idea of representative 
institutions was not altogether unknown to the Greeks. 
Not only are we introduced here to the notion and prominence of representation 
in a democracy, but we are also told about the principles and the mechanism of 
putting together a representative body. So much so that, a bicameral assembly, 
to use contemporary terminology, is recommended “consisting of the Athenian 
Council and Assembly, and […] ‘a synod of representatives from all the other 
states of the league.’”2  
Like many of Aristotle’s insightful ideas, the notion of a national representa-
tive assembly, even in its rudimentary forms, had to wait for many centuries 
before becoming a reality.3 However, those who did not believe a representa-
tive political system was cause for celebration were in distinguished company 
as well. Rousseau, for one, had no appreciation whatsoever for representative 
government. “Sovereignty cannot be represented” he wrote,  
for the same reason that it cannot be alienated. It consists essentially in the 
general will, and will cannot be represented; will either is, or is not, your own; 
there is no intermediate possibility. Thus deputies of the people are not, and 
cannot be, its representatives. (Rousseau 1953 [1762], 103-4) 
If we apply Rousseau’s argument to our day, almost all laws of contemporary 
democracies are illegitimate and invalid since “Any law which the people has 
not ratified in person is null and void; it is not a law.” To Rousseau, this is no 
less than an existential question: “as soon as a people gives itself representa-
tives, it is no longer free, and no longer exists.” (Rousseau 1953 [1762], 103-4). 
Needless to say, history has not favored Rousseau’s position. Today, a rep-
resentative legislative body has become almost sine qua non of contemporary 
democracies while direct democracies have all but vanished. Nevertheless, we 
do not take sides with Rousseau and think that this development is something 
to lament. Indeed, “[a]ddressing the norms appropriate to a system of represen-
tation assumes that representation is, and is normatively intended to be, some-
thing more than a defective substitute for direct democracy” (Mansbridge 
2003, 515; emphasis ours). Undeniably, “the notion of representation occupies 
a central place in Western thinking about the state” (Achen 1978, 475). We 
might well add that “the notion of representation occupies a central place” not 
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only in Western but in universal thinking as well about liberal democracy. 
After all,  
Representation is about designing appropriate institutional mechanisms of 
transferring and transforming popular preferences, including grievances, to the 
upper levels of the political system. (Best, Lengyel and Verzichelli 2012, 9)  
We have already noted that for Rousseau (and few remaining advocates of 
direct democracy) “democracy was direct or it wasn’t. […] In other words, 
representative democracy is no democracy at all” (Landemore 2016, 2). We 
dare to take the diametrically opposite position and claim that, in the highly 
complex societies of today, it is more like “no meaningful representation, no 
democracy!” It would be unrealistic to expect modern democracies to fulfill 
their functions without an elected parliament, and direct democracy is indeed 
no more than a charming myth (Landemore 2016). As Disch (2011, 104) has 
put it “[i]t is only through representation that a people comes to be as a political 
agent, one capable of putting forward a demand.”  
To be fair, there are scholars who emphasize the shortcomings of the notion 
as well as the practice of representation in contemporary democracies but, in 
our opinion, a radical overhaul of the system is neither possible, nor desirable.4 
On the other hand, the line of representation from the citizens to the legisla-
tors is no longer direct since contemporary democracies have introduced an 
intermediary stage on the link between the represented and the representative: 
the modern political party (Dalton 1985; Klingemann, Gancheva and Wessels 
2017; Miller and Stokes 1963; Pettersson 2010). 
Although hardly “representative” as we understand the term today, histori-
ans trace the birth of national parliaments all the way to the 13th century when 
the “Parliament of England” was established as the legislative body of the 
English Kingdom.5 Nevertheless, important theoretical questions, with signifi-
cant practical import as well, concerning the nature of representation in democ-
racies, still remain largely unresolved. There is no consensus in modern politi-
cal science even on the definition of “political representation” although there is 
near unanimity in regarding “nationally representative” legislatures as one of 
the main pillars of modern liberal democracies.6 The term “political elites” 
extends far beyond parliamentary elites but a discussion of the myriad defini-
tions of political elites in specific and elites more generally is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Suffice it to note that we consider Mills’s classical definition that 
“the elite are simply those who have the most of what there is to have, which is 
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5  In this context, one can also mention the Cortes in Medieval Spain (Kingdom of Leon and 
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6  See, for example, Andeweg (2011); Dalton, Farrell and McAllister (2011); Dumont, Fivaz and 
Schwartz (2017); Huber and Powell, Jr. (1994); Otero-Felipe and Rodriguez-Zepeda (2010). 
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generally held to include money, power, and prestige – as well as all the ways 
of life to which these lead” (Mills 1956, 9) as a valid starting point.  
For the purpose of the present paper, we limit our discussion to representa-
tion via elected parliamentarians – and the political parties they are affiliated 
with. From this narrower perspective, one fundamental question seems to con-
stitute the basis of the various approaches to political representation: what is 
the proper mandate of an (elected) representative? Further theoretical questions 
will most likely depend on our answer to this basic problematic of trustee vs. 
delegate model of representation. 
At least partially dependent on the preferred model of representation, ana-
lysts have to tackle the rather thorny issue of the desirable – if not idealistic – 
degree of congruence between the representatives and the represented. This 
question, in turn, is tied to the empirical problem of how to measure congru-
ence and incongruence. But prior to deciding the degree and the method of 
measuring congruence, one has to know what to measure. Granted that “[t]he 
democratic process […] depends on an effective and responsive relationship 
between the representative and the represented,” (Dalton, Farrell and McAllis-
ter 2011, 21) does “effective and responsive relationship” refer to major policy 
decisions, ideology, basic values, or demographic and social background char-
acteristics of legislators, or perhaps a combination of some or all of these? 
And where should we be looking at to measure and assess congruence? Put 
differently, whose values, ideologies, and policy preferences are we to compare 
to decide there is or there is not a certain degree of congruence? This question 
is particularly relevant in modern democracies where the electorates’ demands 
are mediated through political parties. Should we, then, look for agreement 
between individual political parties and their constituencies (dyadic representa-
tion) or should we require the parliament, as a whole, to be “representative” of 
the whole nation (collective representation)?  
Finally, is democracy a “one-way street,” perhaps a “conveyor belt” trans-
mitting demands, preferences, and concerns from the electorate to their repre-
sentatives or do political elites shape the ideologies and preferences of the 
masses? If the latter, does that square with the normative desiderata of an ideal 
(or, perhaps, “idealized”) democracy? 
Needless to say, these are not easy questions with simple answers. Hence, 
we would like to turn our attention, albeit very briefly, to these questions of 
both theoretical and practical significance before presenting our empirical 
findings based on data collected in seven countries in 2007 and 2013. 
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2.  Approaches to Democratic Representation 
2.1  Trustee vs. Delegate Models of Representation 
In representative democracies, members of legislative bodies are elected by the 
electorate with a mandate but the nature of this mandate is not well-defined. 
The so-called trustee versus delegate (imperative) models of political represen-
tation have been a debate topic from very early on. The core question is whether 
the representatives, once elected, should be free to use their own judgment and 
make their decisions which, in their discretion and good conscience, are the 
best for their constituents or should they be restricted by the will of their electors 
with whom they are duty-bound to be in constant close contact. This remains to 
be the core question although different terminologies may be preferred by 
different authors.7 
According to the European Commission for Democracy Through Law (more 
commonly referred to as the Venice Commission), the origins of the imperative 
mandate goes all the way to Roman Law (Venice Commission 2009). On the 
other hand, the best known and the most frequently quoted statement on the 
trustee-delegate controversy is Edmund Burke’s condemnation of the instructed 
delegate model and his passionate defense of the trustee approach. In a speech 
he delivered to the electors of Bristol in 1774, he spoke with eloquence: 
Certainly, gentlemen, it ought to be the happiness and glory of a representa-
tive to live in the strictest union, the closest correspondence, and the most un-
reserved communication with his constituents. Their wishes ought to have 
great weight with him; their opinion, high respect; their business, unremitted 
attention. It is his duty to sacrifice his repose, his pleasures, his satisfactions, 
to theirs; and above all, ever, and in all cases, to prefer their interest to his 
own. But his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened con-
science, he ought not to sacrifice to you, to any man, or to any set of men liv-
ing. These he does not derive from your pleasure; no, nor from the law and the 
constitution. They are a trust from Providence, for the abuse of which he is 
deeply answerable. Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but 
his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your 
opinion. 
[…] what sort of reason is that, in which the determination precedes the dis-
cussion; in which one set of men deliberate; and another decide; and where 
those who form the conclusion are perhaps three hundred miles distant from 
those who hear the arguments? 
                                                             
7  Some examples are: Imperative mandate vs free mandate (The Venice Commission 2009); 
imperative mandate vs representational mandate (van der Hulst 2000); trustee vs instructed 
delegate (Miller and Stokes 1963). 
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[…] but authoritative instructions; mandates issued, which the member is 
bound to blindly and implicitly to obey, to vote, and to argue for, though con-
trary to the clearest conviction of his judgement and conscience, – these are 
things utterly unknown to the laws of this land […]. [italics original] 
And, Burke ended his address with the declaration that 
Parliament is not a congress [italics original] of ambassadors from different 
and hostile interests, which interests each must maintain, as an agent and ad-
vocate, against other agents and advocates; but parliament is a deliberative as-
sembly of one nation, with one interest, that of a whole. [italics original]8  
The two models have rather different implications from the main perspective of 
the present paper, i.e., the degree of congruence between the electorate and the 
legislator. The delegate model assumes a much higher fit than the trustee model 
while the latter allows a considerable degree of flexibility in this respect (Pet-
tersson 2010). Of equal relevance is the warning in a report by the Inter-
Parliamentary Union that  
In heterogeneous societies, the imperative mandate inevitably leads to increased 
polarization, while the representational mandate seems to be more conducive 
to compromise and the search for consensus. (Van der Hulst 2000, 11)  
In an era of high levels of polarization in many new as well as consolidated 
democracies, this warning is worthy of attention. 
It is hardly any surprise that while the delegate model has more appeal for 
the citizens, parliamentarians favor the trustee model. The former group would 
like their “instructions” to be meticulously carried out and the latter would like 
as much freedom and flexibility as possible (Pettersson 2010, 122). 
In more recent discussions, some additions or modifications have been pro-
posed to the old, and we believe still largely valid, schema. Of these, the so-
called “responsible party” model seems especially pertinent for this paper.9 
Initially proposed by Miller and Stokes (1963) the responsible party model  
is based on the assumption that representation is achieved through the collective 
efforts of political parties to aggregate the interests of their followers […]. In 
this model, political parties serve as mediators of representation, resulting in 
shared policy preferences of deputies and voters (Hoffman-Lange 2008, 56). 
Although Miller and Stokes warned against ignoring the role of political par-
ties, the US tradition in general – as well as their work in particular – has been 
criticized for failing to adequately account for the vital function of political 
parties especially in European parliamentary systems (Weßels 2007, 839). 
                                                             
8  <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7.html> (Accessed April 6, 2018). 
9  Additionally, one could mention Mansbridge (2003); Pitkin (1967); Rehfeld (2009). All three 
authors believe the traditional delegate-trustee classification is not adequate and propose 
additional or different dimensions or categories. 
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Indeed, their well-known diagram, frequently referred to as the diamond model 
of representation (1963, 50), does not include political parties at all.10 
The responsible party model can be seen as a variation of the delegate model 
where the deputies are, in a way, delegates of their parties and are never ex-
pected to make policy choices that are not in agreement with their party’s 
program or centrally drawn up platform. This model is more appropriate for 
parliamentary systems with disciplined parties.  
In discussions of the three approaches to representation that we have briefly 
reviewed above, it is important to keep in mind that these models are not mutu-
ally exclusive (Pettersson 2010). 
In Section 3, we attempt to test both the delegate model (representatives are 
delegates of the whole nation) and the party model (representatives are bound 
by their parties’ instructions) with data from our seven countries. 
2.2  Level and Measurement of Congruence 
We know that complete match between citizens and their representatives is 
impossible – and it is largely accepted that such “one-to-one model” is not 
desirable either. However, it is widely agreed upon that democracies are ex-
pected to achieve some acceptable level of congruity. Otherwise, the term 
representation loses its meaning. Indeed “even those adopting a trustee view of 
representation accept that deviations from constituent preferences should be 
infrequent and congruence the norm” (Pitkin 1967, 209-10). After all, liberal 
democracy prides itself in establishing a link between voters and the elected 
and claiming that it is a regime in which those who govern must pay close 
attention to the demands and preferences of the governed (Huber and Powell, 
Jr. 1994; Otero-Felipe and Rodriguez-Zepeda 2010; Rehfeld 2009). It is not 
unusual that the degree of congruence is taken to be an indicator of the quality 
of democracy (Achen 1978; Rosema, Aarts and Denters 2011) or, as articulated 
by Powell, (2013, 9) “[d]emocratic theory assumes that democratic representa-
tion will create close ideological congruence between citizens and their gov-
ernments.”  
It is not possible to objectively quantify the acceptable or desirable levels of 
similarity for different models of representation. In fact, this is a major criti-
cism directed against empirical studies of representational responsiveness 
(Sabl 2015). Nonetheless, various methods for the quantitative measurement of 
congruity/incongruity have been proposed. The first measures for comparison 
that come to mind are the mean and the median for assessing elite-mass con-
gruence and simple percentages for studies of legislators. However, it was 
rightly pointed out that such comparisons of measures of central tendency, 
useful as they are, totally ignore dispersion and this, for obvious reasons, could 
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be misleading. Indeed, it is quite conceivable for the two groups to have equal 
or nearly equal measures of central tendency with very dissimilar distribu-
tions.11 Hence the need to include some measure of dispersion in the compari-
son. 
Achen’s summary of the basic assumptions and the techniques of elite-mass 
comparison are somewhat old but still largely valid. Based on the postulation 
that “[t]he representatives’ opinions serve as proxies for their behavior,” Achen 
(1978, 490) derives three measures of representativeness. They are: (1) Proxim-
ity which addresses the notion of ideological distance between citizens and 
their representatives; the square or the absolute value of their positions on 
similar scales are the obvious possible measures of proximity; (2) Centrism 
takes into account the variance of the indicator in a representative’s constituen-
cy; and (3) Responsiveness “describes how representatives’ views in liberal 
districts compare with those in conservative districts.”  
Assuming that the indicator is measured with the same scale (interval) for 
both parliamentarians and citizens, taking into account dispersion provides 
more information and a better measure of congruence. For comparison of dis-
tributions, some authors (e.g., Pettersson 2010) prefer the cumulative distribu-
tion function while others opt for the non-cumulative distribution function 
(e.g., Andeweg 2011). We will use the latter technique since it easily “lends 
itself to visual presentation, and it is intuitively more appealing to have a meas-
ure ranging from zero […] to 100” (Andeweg 2011, 43). 
2.3  Dimensions of Congruence 
The literature on the topic of congruence/incongruence between masses and 
elites is considerable and many of these studies are based on empirical find-
ings. According to Higley,  
The theory [i.e., the theory of democratic elitism]12 has made interactions be-
tween mass publics and elites an abiding research focus, spawning countless 
studies that have investigated the degree of concordance between mass and 
elite opinions. (2007, 249)13 
We have already noted the near unanimity on the importance of elite-mass 
congruence as an indicator of the quality of democracy albeit with some quali-
fications. But this general statement is hardly adequate for purposes of rigorous 
research which will require the specification of the indicators or dimensions, 
                                                             
11  Imagine, for instance, a 10-point Left-Right scale on which one group is heavily concentrated 
at the extremes while the other peaks around the center. Both distributions will yield equal 
or nearly equal measures of central tendency. When one considers only the mean or the 
median, one will miss the high degree of ideological polarization in the former group. 
12  For a classical and succinct source on the theory of democratic elitism, see Bachrach (1967). 
13  Disch (2011) proposes a shift from responsiveness to what she calls “reflexivity.”  
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preferably based on sound theory, of this elite-mass harmony. Put differently, 
the simple question is: when we evaluate representation, specifically what is it 
that we are comparing? 
Hoffmann-Lange (2007) identifies four substantive areas of elite research. 
They are, (a) social background studies; (b) analyses of elite careers; (c) activi-
ties, values, and attitudes of elites; and (d) access to central political decision-
makers. For our purposes, we delineate the areas that figure out prominently in 
the literature on the measurement of mass-elite congruence.  
First, as Hoffmann-Lange points out, there are social background and de-
mographic studies – some only of elites and occasionally from a comparative 
perspective. From a practical point of view, these are the easiest to conduct 
since data can readily be put together from albums, yearbooks, and various 
other public records. Social background studies have been around for at least a 
century and a half (Hoffmann-Lange 2006). 
Second, research on elite values, ideologies, attitudes, and behavior – and 
their comparison with the general public – had to wait for the development of 
sophisticated survey methodology. Fortunately, researchers are now in a posi-
tion of having access to considerable amount of data from elite surveys. Sys-
tematic evaluations of elite-mass values, however, are still numbered particu-
larly if we are interested in international comparisons. Support for democratic 
values is especially relevant from a democratic culture perspective. Welzel and 
Klingemann (2011, 92) write that “by definition, congruent regimes are in 
accordance with a population’s prevailing legitimacy beliefs and thus receive 
more mass support than incongruent ones.” 
Third, most political elite studies focus on congruence of policy preferences 
– and, in the case of policy-makers – on policy-related behavior. Studies of the 
US Congress are most prominent examples of policy congruence studies. If the 
researcher focuses on the behavior – rather than ideological preferences – of 
policy-makers, then no elite surveys will be needed and one need to look no 
further than roll calls. However, we know that, unless tied to some ideology, 
policy preferences are not stable over time and that presents a problem for the 
interpretation of policy congruence studies. 
2.4  Whose Congruence? 
The debate on where (between which groups or individuals) we should seek 
congruence is of crucial importance. To be more specific, which of the following 
options is/are more relevant for students of democratic theory and legitimacy? 
The possibilities are: 
1. Congruence between an individual legislator (or government mem-
ber) and citizens (frequently operationalized as the median voter); 
2. Congruence between legislature (or government) as a whole and citi-
zens; 
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3. Congruence between an individual legislator of a political party and 
supporters of that party; 
4. Congruence between legislators (or leadership) of a political party 
and supporters of that party; 
5. Congruence between an individual legislator and his/her geographical 
constituency.14 
The controversy at the root of these possible ways of measuring congruence is 
the debate over the definition of a political representative: does he/she repre-
sent his/her constituency – be it geographic or otherwise – or, once elected, 
does he/she become a representative of the whole nation?  
In this paper, we limit ourselves to options (2) and (4) although the other op-
tions, no doubt, have relevance for different research problems. 
2.5  Direction of Incongruence Resolution 
In case of incongruence, do the representatives comply with the wishes of the 
elected or does the process work in the opposite direction? Or are we perhaps 
faced with a two-way rather than a one-way street? Or, to make things even 
more complicated, should we admit that this is not a “one size fits all” situation 
and factors like political culture, political system, characteristics of leadership 
(and perhaps some other variables) have to be taken into account? 
Welzel and Klingemann (2011) assign the priority to the citizens in general. 
In their words  
Congruence theory suggests that institutionalized authority patterns tend to be 
in accordance with the legitimacy beliefs of most of the population in a coun-
try. Thus, people’s authority beliefs should – at any given point in time – be a 
powerful predictor of the institutionalized authority patterns. (2011, 93)  
Holmberg (2011) seems to disagree. To him, most of time, it is the elected 
representatives who exert more influence on voters and not the other way 
around. So the process is top-down and even in a democracy, public opinion is 
mostly “shaped by” the leaders. 
We believe the process works both ways. If the regime deserves to be called 
democratic, the representatives cannot be expected to completely ignore the 
wishes and demands of their constituents even if they favor the trustee model 
of representation. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that public opinion is 
formed entirely independently of the political (as well as media, business, etc.) 
elites. 
                                                             
14  Golder and Stramski (2010) have a similar but not identical list of possibilities. They review 
possibilities under two main headings (Many-to-One Relationships and Many-to-Many Re-
lationships) which, in turn, are divided into subcategories. 
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3. Seven-Nation Study of Citizen-Parliamentarian 
Concordance, 2007 and 2013 
The following analyses are based on data collected from random samples of 
members of parliament in Chile, Germany, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, 
Sweden, and Turkey in 200715 and 2013.16 Roughly around the same times, the 
World Values/European Values Surveys were carried out with national repre-
sentative samples in the same seven countries. Both projects included a number 
of identical questions. Thus, the resulting data set provides a unique opportuni-
ty to measure congruence between members of parliaments and citizens and 
allows longitudinal comparisons as well. The choice of seven countries is not 
haphazard but includes all major religious traditions, established as well as new 
democracies, parliamentary, and presidential systems and the widest possible 
geographic coverage.17 
There is no doubt that, in theory, democratic representation means at least 
some degree of communality in values and policy preferences between the 
represented and the representative. This is true regardless of one’s preferred 
theory of representation (Pitkin 1967). However, from an empirical viewpoint, 
the core question is whether or not these are (in our case, the electorate and 
MPs) valid categories for comparison. Pettersson (2010) has conducted sophis-
ticated tests to test the validity of these comparisons based on 2007 data from 
our seven countries and has concluded that, at least for values related to democra-
cy, there is a solid basis for analyzing the congruence/incongruence of the two 
groups. We concur with his conclusions and proceed to present our findings. 
We cannot, within the limits of this paper, possibly resolve all the theoreti-
cal issues of democratic representation but will at least briefly address some of 
the most relevant questions to the extent our data will allow. Thus, we will 
measure citizen-MP congruence in three areas: ideology, policy, and democratic 
values. Additionally, we shall be comparing (1) parliaments as a whole with all 
citizens and (2) MPs of major parties with supporters of those parties. Further-
more, we shall have the chance to observe the changes that might have oc-
curred between the two survey rounds.18 
                                                             
15  For an excellent collection of articles based on data from the 2007 survey of MPs, see van 
Beek (2010). 
16  2013 surveys of parliamentarians in seven countries were funded by the Riksbankens Jubi-
leumsfond of Sweden. The authors gratefully acknowledge the generous support of the 
Fund without which this research would not have been possible.  
17  For detailed information on both surveys, see Hoffmann-Lange (2018). 
18  We would like to note that the authors of the present paper owe great intellectual debt to 
Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Ursula Hoffman-Lange, and the late Thorleif Pettersson whose 
earlier work on the same data sets served as an invaluable source of inspiration. As a matter 
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3.1  Ideological Congruence 
Even a casual survey of the literature reveals that, more often than not, political 
ideology is operationalized by the widely accepted, documented, and analyzed 
“Left-Right scale” (a 10-point scale in some surveys, e.g., the WVS and an  
11-point scale in others, e.g., the ESS). This indicator is treated as a close 
proxy for or a good predictor of a wide range of variables from voter prefer-
ences to policy choices. A majority of studies of political representation use the 
Left-Right scale, as well, to measure ideological congruence between citizens 
and their representatives (e.g., Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Huber and Powell 
1994; Powell and Vanberg 2000; Thomassen 2012).  
More than two decades ago, Listhaug and Wiberg observed that “[a]mong 
the factors influencing voting behaviour and political evaluations at the mass 
level, the consistently most important is the left-right ideology” (1995, 315). 
The connection between voting behavior and Left-Right ideology has been 
confirmed and re-confirmed in numerous studies and in different Western 
countries since the publication of the Listhaug and Wiberg article and for an 
obvious reason: “left-right ideology has long been a dominant cleavage in the 
politics of the industrialized democracies” (ibid.). However, the Left-Right 
dimension has been much more than a mirror for the industrial class society. 
Indeed, it has become “a kind of ‘super-issue’ encompassing various issue 
domains” (Thomassen 2012, 14). Along the same lines, Fuchs and Klingemann 
(1990, 205) have viewed the Left-Right scale “as a mechanism for the reduc-
tion of complexity which serves primarily as an orientation function for indi-
viduals and a communication function for the political system.” Thus, from this 
perspective, Left-Right ideology has two important functions: (a) it helps indi-
vidual citizens find their way through the complexities of politics and (b) it 
provides the system (and institutional actors of the system such as political 
parties) with an instrument to communicate their positions in a simple and 
easily comprehensible manner. What more could one possibly ask of a single 
concept and a single measure!  
If Left-Right ideology is such a valuable key to predicting important puzzles 
of political life, that assumption should hold for both citizens and their repre-
sentatives. Hence, we ask the following questions: 
a) What is the degree of ideological congruence, as measured with the wide-
ly used Left-Right scale, between political representatives and citizens?19 
                                                                                                                                
of fact the present work is an extension and perhaps expansion of Hoffmann-Lange (2010, 
2016) and Pettersson (2010). 
19  Our analyses use respondents’ (that is citizens as well as MPs) own positions on the ideology 
scale. Although the questionnaire included two more Left-Right scales (assessment of party 
positions and perceived positions of party supporters) we believe respondents’ position is 
the appropriate choice since we are concerned with the individual’s ideological position ra-
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b) Should we be looking at collective or dyadic representativeness with 
regard to this indicator? 
3.1.1  Collective Representation (Ideological Congruence) 
As explained earlier, we use WVS/EVS plus parliamentarians’ data for our 
seven countries in an attempt to answer these questions and we shall be analyzing 
non-cumulative distribution functions (Andeweg 2011).20 In Table 1 (first two 
rows for each country), we summarize the findings related to the overlap (both 
for each score on the scale and the total percentage overlap) of the left-right 
scale between the citizens and the parliamentarians of our seven countries.  
The first thing we observe about in toto overlaps given in Table 1 is the high 
degree of congruence except for South Africa and Poland in 2007 and, perhaps 
to some limited extent, for South Africa in 2013 as well. The finding for South 
Africa would be expected given that the cleavages based on class, to the extent 
that they exist, are fairly recent phenomena in that country and, for that matter, 
in most other African countries. However, the low degree of congruence in 
Poland in 2007 comes as a surprise especially considering the rather sizeable 
difference of almost 18 percentage points between 2007 and 2013. Nevertheless, 
even in these two countries, the total overlap is over 50% for both survey years. 
Second, except for Poland, there is a very high degree of consistency be-
tween 2007 and 2013 in total overlap percentages. 
The most significant finding is that, with regard to Left-Right ideology, par-
liaments as a whole are highly representative of the electorate in six out of 
seven countries with Sweden achieving the highest level of ideological congru-
ence. Data in Table 1 are summarized visually in Figure 1 (all figures in the 
Appendix). 
 
  
                                                                                                                                
ther than the party’s position. However, the two measures are highly correlated (see Hoff-
mann-Lange 2018). 
20  As explained by Andeweg (2011), in this technique, the overlap is calculated by cumulating 
the smaller value of the two distributions for each scale value. More concretely, suppose 3% 
of citizens and 2.5% of parliamentarians have chosen 1 on the scale. Then, the first quantity 
to be cumulated is 2.5%. The process is repeated for all 10 scores of the scale. 
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Table 1:  Overlap of Distributions of Left-Right Scale: Collective and Dyadic 
Representation (Non-Cumulative Distribution Functions for Citizens 
and Parliamentarians of the Given Party) 
 Total % overlap 
Chile 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 68.2% 
2013 73.2% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
UDI 60.4% 
PDC 58.8% 
Germany 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 76.7% 
2013 69.9% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
CDU 66.3% 
SPD 45.9% 
Poland 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 54.9% 
2013 72.6% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
PİS 59.1% 
PO 64.4% 
S. Africa 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 52.5% 
2013 58.6% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
ANC 54.5% 
DA 66.0% 
S. Korea 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 81.0% 
2013 82.6% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
NFP 60.5% 
DP 68.5% 
Sweden 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 89.8% 
2013 80.7% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
MS 78.7% 
SD 61.8% 
Turkey 
Citizens and Parliament 
2007 76.1% 
2013 77.0% 
Two Largest Parties (2013) 
AKP 78.0% 
CHP 47.0% 
3.1.2  Dyadic Representation (Ideological Congruence) 
We next consider the degree of ideological congruence between political par-
ties and their supporters. We define “supporter” as voters who have indicated 
in WVS/EVS mass surveys that they would vote for a given political party in 
general elections. Dyadic representation is important because it is frequently 
argued that “[t]he policy agreement between voters and their preferred party 
[…] is a central measure of the functioning of representative democracy” (Dal-
ton 2015, 610). Dalton (2015) finds high levels of congruence on Left-Right 
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ideology between the publics of 24 member states of the European Union and 
the candidates – not MEPs but candidates – of their preferred parties in the 
European Parliament elections.  
The results (summarized in Table 2 and Figure 2) of our dyadic analyses for 
the 2013 data come as a surprise and certainly do not agree with Dalton’s 
findings. Our data also contradict Pierce’s speculation, as summarized by 
Hoffmann-Lange (2008) that – at least in Europe – although policy congruence 
between party leaderships and supporters is lower than expected, ideological 
congruence (operationalized with the Left-Right scale) should be high.  
Indeed, one would ordinarily expect a higher degree of congruence between 
the MPs of a given political party and the supporters of that party. On the 
contrary, in almost all cases, the ideological overlap between the two largest 
parties in the parliaments of seven countries on the one hand and their support-
ers on the other is smaller, not greater in comparison to the overlap between the 
parliaments and voters as a whole. This holds true for both major parties in 
Chile, Germany, Poland, South Korea, and Sweden and also for ANC in South 
Africa and CHP in Turkey. Of the 14 parties in seven countries, the only two 
exceptions are Democratic Alliance in South Africa and AKP in Turkey but, in 
the Turkish case, the difference (1.0 percentage point) is negligible. Thus, for 
12 of the 14 parties in seven countries (two largest political parties represented 
in the legislature in each country), the ideological overlap – measured with 
non-cumulative distribution functions – between a given party’s legislators and 
supporters is smaller than the overlap between the given country’s voters and 
parliamentarians taken as a whole.  
This finding begs an explanation and has prompted us to examine another 
measure of ideological congruence in addition to the non-cumulative distribu-
tion function. Hence, we now consider what is referred to in the relevant litera-
ture as “centrism” that is, the absolute difference between two common 
measures of central tendency, the mean or the median (Dalton 2015; Achen 
1978; Mansbridge 2003; Pettersson 2010). Dyadic comparisons of measures of 
central tendency for the Left-Right scale are summarized in Table 2.  
In comparison to measures of dispersion, measures of central tendency tell a 
different story indeed. 
First, the differences between the citizens’ and parliamentarians’ L-R ideol-
ogy (last two columns of Table 2) are much less pronounced compared to non-
cumulative distribution functions.  
Second, except for Chile, social democratic (or center-left) parties are less 
representative of their supporters as compared to the center-right parties and, 
except for Sweden, the differences are considerable. This is true for SPD of 
Germany, ANC of South Africa, Minjuang (DP) of South Korea, Social Demo-
crats of Sweden, and CHP of Turkey. (Poland is excluded from this comparison 
due to the fact that both of its two largest parties are to the right of the ideolog-
ical spectrum.)  
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Table 2: Collective and Dyadic Measures of Central Tendency for the Left-
Right Scale, 2013 
Country Total Country and Party 
Citizens Parliamentarians Difference (citizens-MPs) 
Mean Mean Mean 
Chile 
Collective 5.10 5.66 -0.56 
UDI 7.67 7.91 -0.24 
PDC 4.79 4.87 -0.08 
Germany 
Collective 5.02 4.46 0.56 
CDU 5.79 6.12 -0.33 
SPD 4.64 3.10 1.54 
Poland 
Collective 5.53 6.57 -1.04 
PiS 7.25 8.82 -1.57 
Po 5.62 6.37 -0.75 
S. Africa 
Collective 6.25 4.10 2.15 
ANC 6.44 3.89 2.55 
DA 5.62 4.84 0.78 
S. Korea 
Collective 5.36 5.27 0.09 
NFP 6.25 6.59 -0.34 
DP 4.80 3.62 1.18 
Sweden 
Collective 5.42 5.56 -0.14 
SD 3.83 3.44 0.39 
MS 7.77 8.06 -0.29 
Turkey 
Collective 6.39 5.66 0.73 
AKP 7.41 7.45 -0.04 
CHP 4.57 2.14 2.43 
 
Third, for all five center-left parties mentioned above, representatives are to the 
left of their supporters. Thomassen (2012) reached a similar conclusion with 
respect to issues related to law and order, immigration, minorities and Europe-
an integration. This finding seems to hold for the L-R positions as well and is 
confirmed in Figure 2 which shows that, for social democratic parties of the 
five countries, the representation gap between the party MPs and the party’s 
supporters peaks on the left of the scale. This explains the “anomaly” in Ta-
ble 2 that we have noted above. 
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3.2  Policy Congruence 
Unlike the L-R scale which is almost universally regarded as the indicator of 
political ideology, the analyst measuring policy congruence is faced with a 
much more complicated task since the choice of indicators is only limited by 
data availability and their relevance might show great variability from one 
country to another. Clearly, European integration or immigration, for instance, 
are non-issues in a sizeable majority of countries and this is true for even our 
extremely limited sample of seven countries.  
To assess policy congruence we analyze an additive index21 of three policy 
questions that were included in both questionnaires (i.e. parliamentarians and 
the general public) for both survey waves and which we believe are meaningful 
policy domains in all of our seven countries.22 All three questions are 10-point 
scales and all tap economic policy preferences. The questions are related to 
opinions on: 
1. Whether or not it is the government’s responsibility to see to it that all 
citizens are provided for; 
2. Whether incomes should be made more equal or more income differ-
ences are needed; 
3. Whether government or private ownership of business and industry 
should be increased.23 
From a theoretical perspective, all three questions should be related to ideology 
and particularly Left-Right ideology. Clearly, the end points of the scales re-
present classical positions of the Left and the Right. Our findings indicate that 
Thomassen (2012) who observed that a strong association between Left-Right 
ideology and policy preferences should not be taken for granted, is partially but 
not entirely confirmed (Table 3).  
In Table 3, we report a total 84 correlation coefficients for 2007 and 2013. 
Of these, 77 are in the expected direction. Furthermore, five of the seven ex-
ceptions (indicated in bold) do not attain statistical significance. Thus, we can 
confidently state that, for our seven countries, the more to the left a person is 
on the ideology scale, the more likely he/she is to favor more equitable income 
distribution, more state (as opposed to private) ownership of industry and busi-
ness and more state responsibility for taking care of citizens’ basic needs. Very 
briefly, we draw the following conclusions from Table 3: 
                                                             
21  The index is constructed as follows: a) variables are recoded so that in all three of them 
higher values point out to the same ideological preference, and then b) taking the arithme-
tic mean of the three variables and rounding the resulting index to whole numbers. With 
our sample of parliamentarians from seven countries (2013), policy variables are all positive-
ly correlated and Cronbach’s alpha is 0.674. 
22  This is evidenced by the fact that, overall, the proportions of non-responses (don’t know 
plus refusal) are usually less than 2% and never exceed 5%. 
23  The exact wording of the questions are given in the appendix. 
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1) Without exception, correlations of MPs are all in expected direction. 
This is true for all seven countries and for both points in time. 
2) In almost all cases, MP correlations are greater in magnitude that citi-
zen correlations, and most of the time considerably so.  
3) Consequently, MPs have much stronger ideological awareness (and 
consistency) and appear to exhibit a much better fit between their 
(and their party’s) ideology and policy preferences. 
4) Uniformly, the link between ideology and policy preferences is con-
siderably weaker for parliamentarians of Poland and South Africa. 
5) Correlations, and especially citizen correlations, in Table 3 do warrant a 
separate analysis of congruence in policy preferences between general 
publics and their parliamentary representatives since it is problematic 
to assume that the Left-Right ideology will suffice for policy choice. 
Table 3: Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Left-Right Ideology Scale 
and Economic Policy Variables 
 Incomes should be more  
or less equal 
 
(1 indicates more, 10 
indicates less equal) 
Government vs. private 
ownership of business 
 
(1 indicates more private, 
10 indicates more state 
ownership) 
Government or private 
responsibility to provide 
for citizens 
 
(1 indicates more state, 10 
indicates more individual 
responsibility) 
Citizens MPs Citizens MPs Citizens MPs 
2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 2007 2013 
Chile .096* .322** .661** .347** .122** .235** .729** .257** .081* .360** .620** .326** 
Germany .162** .225** .739** .716** .141** .082** .518** .466** .083** .152** .743** .738** 
Poland .012 -.005 .174 .019 -.029 -.031 -.268* -.017 .008 -.032 .071 .167* 
S. Africa .083** .258** .066 .177* .022 .196** -.079 -.122 .106** .229** .142 .002 
S. Korea .052 .100** .646** .669** .043 -.051 .515** .397** .139** .129** .441** .505** 
Sweden .485** .498** .781** .823** .510** .377** .812** .748** .423** .491** .756** .767** 
Turkey .112** .024 .431** .528** .065* -.024 .399** .512** .086** -.016 .404** .543** 
Note: *p.<= 0.05; **p<= 0.01. 
3.2.1  Collective Representation (Policy Preference Congruence) 
Table 4 summarizes the percent overlap between citizens’ and parliamentarians’ 
policy preferences for 2013. The first and the most striking finding is the amaz-
ingly high levels of congruence between citizens and their representatives. The 
figure exceeds 90% in South Korea and the lowest overlap in our sample is for 
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Turkey (71%) but even that is not a level one would particularly be concerned 
about. 
The second point that is worthy of mention is that the MPs of Germany and 
Sweden, our two benchmark democracies, do not have the highest levels of 
overlap. On the contrary, the fit between the two groups is somewhat better in 
Chile, Poland, and particularly South Korea. This brings into question the 
assertion that higher levels of elite-mass congruence should be expected in 
consolidated and advanced democracies (Holmberg 2011). At least for our 
economic policy variables, this assumption does not hold. Our findings with 
respect to policy preferences confirm Pettersson’s (2010, 142) conclusion that 
“better elite-mass congruence among the more advanced democracies” is not 
supported by our data. 
Table 4: Overlap of Distributions of Policy Scale: Collective and Dyadic 
Representation (Non-Cumulative Distribution Functions for Citizens 
and Parliamentarians of the Given Party) 
 
  
Total % 
overlap 
Chile 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 87.9% 
Two Largest Parties 
UDI 74.8% 
PDC 79.8% 
Germany 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 75.9% 
Two Largest Parties 
CDU 48.9% 
SPD 65.3% 
Poland 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 80.2% 
Two Largest Parties 
PİS 67.8% 
PO 62.7% 
S. Africa 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 74.7% 
Two Largest Parties 
ANC 66.6% 
DA 59.5% 
S.  Korea 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 91.8% 
Two Largest Parties 
NFP 78.8% 
DP 67.1% 
Sweden 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 76.1% 
Two Largest Parties 
MS 56.5% 
SD 70.8% 
Turkey 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 70.9% 
Two Largest Parties 
AKP 49.8% 
CHP 55.6% 
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3.2.2  Dyadic Representation (Policy Preference Congruence) 
Our finding with regard to ideological congruence is repeated and even magni-
fied with regard to economic policy preferences as well (Table 4). Again, par-
liaments as a whole represent citizens significantly better than political parties 
represent their own supporters. For political parties and their supporters, the 
range of overlap is between a minimum of 48.9% (Germany’s center-right 
CDU) and a maximum of 79.8% (Chile’s center-left PDC). Unlike Left-Right 
ideology, however, it is impossible to say that one family of parties (that is, 
social democrats or conservatives) is a better representative of their constitu-
ents since the results vary from country to country. The unweighted arithmetic 
mean of the overlap for the six social democratic parties in Table 4 is only 
slightly better than the mean for the eight center-right parties (67.5% vs. 62.4%, 
respectively).  
Table 5 gives both collective and dyadic measures of central tendency for 
our composite policy scale. Reviewing the means and medians in Table 5, we 
observe the following: 
1) The differences between parliamentarians and citizens are very small. 
2) This is also the case with respect to dyadic differences between means; 
the greatest difference of all is between Turkey’s AKP and its constitu-
ents (2.02). 
3) With respect to the direction of incongruence, the results are mixed. 
Collectively, in Chile, Germany, Poland, Sweden, and Turkey, citizens’ 
mean scores are more in the etatist (state interventionist) direction 
compared to parliamentarians whereas in South Africa and South Korea 
the very slight difference in means is the opposite direction. 
4) The supporters of the left-of-center parties in Germany, South Africa, 
South Korea, Sweden, and Turkey (that is, in 5 out of 6 countries 
whose left-of-center parties are included in the analysis) favor more 
state intervention compared to their deputies. 
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Table 5: Collective and Dyadic Measures of Central Tendency for the Policy 
Scale, 2013 (higher values indicate more rightist policy preferences) 
Country Party 
Citizens Parliamentarians 
Difference 
(citizens-MPs) 
Mean Mean Mean 
Chile 
Collective 3.99 4.15 -0.16 
UDI 4.45 5.25 -0.80 
PDC 3.80 4.00 -0.20 
Germany 
Collective 4.91 5.25 -0.34 
CDU 5.21 6.74 -1.53 
SPD 4.69 3.89 0.80 
Poland 
Collective 5.12 5.81 -0.69 
PiS 4.49 4.49 0 
Po 5.68 6.81 -1.13 
S. Africa 
Collective 5.54 5.23 0.31 
ANC 5.57 4.59 0.98 
DA 5.50 6.87 -1.37 
S. Korea 
Collective 5.12 5.01 0.11 
NFP 5.43 6.00 -0.57 
DP 4.82 3.80 1.02 
Sweden 
Collective 5.39 5.90 -0.51 
SD 4.77 3.82 0.95 
MS 6.70 8.15 -1.45 
Turkey 
Collective 5.09 5.75 -0.66 
AKP 4.82 6.84 -2.02 
CHP 4.72 3.50 1.22 
3.3  Democratic Values 
Not unlike policy indicators, the choice indicators of pro-democratic values is 
not a simple task either. This is especially true when we are limited, as we are, 
with the common questions in both MP and mass surveys. By way of an exam-
ple, Klingemann (1999) uses a 7-point scale that is the sum of two questions: 
agreement that democracy is the best form of government and that democracy 
is a good way of governing. Pettersson (2010) counts the number of “prodemo-
cratic” responses to seven questions. Fuchs (2007) constructs a four-question 
index based on support for democracy and opposition to autocracy. He views 
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respondents in three categories: non-democrats, weak democrats, and solid 
democrats. Esmer (2013) uses a six-question “minimal democrat index” which 
is based on a broader spectrum of basic democratic values. Inglehart and 
Welzel (2005) emphasize the centrality of what they call “self-expression 
values” for democratic cultures. 
Our index for measuring congruence of democratic values is simple. We 
combine two questions common to both surveys: how good or bad would it be 
for the country to have a democratic system plus having a strong leader who 
does not have to bother with parliament and elections. The answers to both of 
these questions range between 1 and 4 resulting in a combined index with 
scores ranging between 2 and 8.24 
3.3.1  Collective Representation (Congruence of Democratic 
Values) 
Table 6 summarizes the collective and dyadic representation levels for the 
simple democratic values index that we have described above. Once again, we 
find the results surprising and perhaps a little disturbing from a democratic 
culture perspective. The surprising point is that the overlap between citizens 
and parliamentarians is considerably lower for democratic values as compared 
to ideology and policy preferences. The disturbing point is the fact that demo-
cratic culture is weaker for the masses in comparison to their representatives. 
This brings to mind the issue raised by Welzel and Klingemann (2011). The 
question is whether or not the popular demand for democracy lags behind its 
supply and, therefore, theories that claim that democracy is basically an elite 
designed and led project have greater validity.25  
The data in Table 6, once again, fail to confirm the hypothesis that the high-
er the quality of democracy in a society, the higher should be the congruence 
between the represented and the representative. From this perspective, even if 
our two indicators are not the best choice to measure democratic values, one 
would, nonetheless, expect at least somewhat greater congruence in Sweden 
and Germany. This is not true and the percent overlap in these two advanced 
democracies is lower than even Turkey. Consequently, and in agreement with 
Pettersson (2010), we also conclude that higher levels of congruence between 
parliamentarians and citizens cannot be taken as an indicator of the quality of 
democracy. 
                                                             
24  This is a simple additive index of two questions mentioned above with the coding in the 
second item (having a strong leader) reversed so that with both items higher scores indicate 
more democratic attitudes. Hoffmann-Lange (2018, in this HSR Special Issue) uses a similar, 
but three-item measure. The two scales are highly correlated. 
25  Introducing the concept of “substantive democracy,” Welzel and Klingemann (2011) answer 
this question in the negative. 
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South Africa has by far the lowest overlap of our seven countries from a 
democratic culture viewpoint. The overlap of the distribution of our democratic 
values index, in this country, is a mere 27%.  
Table 6: Overlap of Distributions of Democratic Values Scale: Collective and 
Dyadic Representation (Non-Cumulative Distribution Functions for 
Citizens and Parliamentarians of the Given Party) 
 Total % overlap 
Chile 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 59.3% 
Two Largest Parties 
UDI 56.7% 
PDC 44.6% 
Germany 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 52.6% 
Two Largest Parties 
CDU 51.6% 
SPD 45.1% 
Poland 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 64.5% 
Two Largest Parties 
PİS 70.4% 
PO 60.6% 
S. Africa 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 27.1% 
Two Largest Parties 
ANC 25.1% 
DA 24.4% 
S.  Korea 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 48.8% 
Two Largest Parties 
NFP 52.5% 
DP 40.4% 
Sweden 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 47.9% 
Two Largest Parties 
MS 51.9% 
SD 43.0% 
Turkey 
Citizens and Parliament 2013 54.1% 
Two Largest Parties 
AKP 62.3% 
CHP 26.8% 
 
It should also be noted that the elite-mass incongruence is observed only at the 
upper (i.e. more democratic) end of our index and the lower cells indicating 
strong non-democratic preferences are empty for both groups. This finding, no 
doubt, comes as an encouragement for democrats. This is very clearly seen in 
Figure 5. 
Nevertheless, Table 7 clearly shows that democratic values, as we have 
measured them, are decisively stronger in our sample of parliamentarians. 
When we examine the arithmetic means for our seven countries as a whole as 
well as the means for individual countries, we observe that for all seven coun-
tries and for 13 of the 14 political parties, the means for MPs exceed those for 
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citizens. The only exception is Poland’s PiS whose representatives’ mean score 
is equal to its supporters’ score. If values can be converted to effective demand, 
then citizens’ demand for democracy is, in all cases, lagging behind the parlia-
mentarians.  
Table 7: Collective and Dyadic Measures of Central Tendency for the 
Democracy Scale, 2013 
Country Party 
Citizens Parliamentarians Difference (Citizens-MPs) 
Mean Mean Mean 
Chile 
Collective 6.32 7.12 -0.80 
UDI 6.20 7.08 -0.88 
PDC 6.29 7.26 -0.97 
Germany 
Collective 6.86 7.91 -1.05 
CDU 6.94 7.92 -0.98 
SPD 6.77 8.00 -1.23 
Poland 
Collective 6.13 7.08 -0.95 
PiS 6.01 6.01 0 
Po 6.28 7.32 -1.04 
S. Africa 
Collective 5.29 7.61 -2.32 
ANC 5.28 7.66 -2.38 
DA 5.19 7.68 -2.49 
S. Korea 
Collective 5.40 7.01 -1.61 
NFP 5.41 6.75 -1.34 
DP 5.45 7.34 -1.89 
Sweden 
Collective 6.78 7.83 -1.05 
SocDem 6.76 7.88 -1.12 
MS 6.74 7.72 -0.98 
Turkey 
Collective 5.78 7.15 -1.37 
AKP 5.76 6.85 -1.09 
CHP 5.74 7.75 -2.01 
3.3.2  Dyadic Representation (Congruence of Democratic Values)  
With respect to our democratic values index, the differences between collective 
and dyadic measures are not as dramatic as they were for ideology and policy 
preferences. In fact, the results are mixed and some parties are better represent-
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atives of their constituents compared to congruence between all citizens and 
parliaments as a whole (Table 6 and Figure 6). This is the case for Poland’s 
PiS, for South Korea’s NFP, for Sweden’s Social Democrats, and for Turkey’s 
AKP. Somewhat ironically, the social democrats of Turkey (CHP) have the 
lowest percent of overlap among all 14 parties that we have looked at. This is 
due to the fact that CHP constituents adhere to democratic values much less 
than their own party’s representatives. Indeed, while our “democratic values” 
mean score is 7.75 out of a maximum score of 8.00 for CHP deputies (except 
for Germany and Sweden, this is the highest score for all remaining parties), 
CHP supporters’ mean is only 5.75. Finally, save for the two parties in South 
Africa and CHP of Turkey, the differences between the medians for party sup-
porters and their MPs never exceed two and in majority of cases it is only one. 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
We have considered three of the most widely referred to dimensions of con-
gruence between citizens and their parliamentary representatives in seven 
countries at two points in time. Our premise was the postulate that a certain – 
and preferably high – degree of congruence between the represented and the 
representative was an essential characteristic of democracy regardless of 
whether we prefer the “trustee” or the “delegate” approach to representation. 
To assess the strength of the congruence and thus (at least according to one 
definition) the quality of representation, we analyzed the overlap between 
legislator and voter positions with regard to ideology, economic policy prefer-
ences, and democratic values. Although we considered measures of central 
tendency as well, our main tool for comparison was the non-cumulative distri-
bution function which, we believe, offers a number of advantages.  
We have found that collective ideological (i.e., position on the Left-Right 
scale) and policy preference (a composite index of three economic policy pref-
erences) congruence was high – in some cases extremely high in our seven 
countries. We can safely conclude that for these countries, parliaments as a 
whole are highly representative of the views of the electorate on these two 
dimensions of representation. 
On the other hand, dyadic levels of congruence between the supporters and 
deputies of given parties are considerably lower. A review of relevant literature 
reveals that the jury is still out on this issue. While some scholars have found 
that there is a high degree of dyadic congruence in some countries, there is 
evidence to the contrary as well. 
Congruence levels for the democratic values scale – which, admittedly, is 
far from being ideal – are much lower than both ideology and policy dimen-
sions of representation. Although, in general, there is very high preference for a 
democratic system of government, citizens are lagging behind their representa-
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tives on this dimension. Put differently, popular demand for democracy is 
behind the levels measured for the political elites. 
Finally, at least in our seven countries, the hypothesis that the quality of de-
mocracy in a country is positively correlated with the degrees of congruence 
between citizens and political elites has not been confirmed. 
References 
Achen, Christopher H. 1978. Measuring Representation. American Journal of 
Political Science 22 (3), <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2110458.pdf> 
(Accessed April 28, 2018). 
Andeweg, Rudy B. 2011. Approaching Perfect Policy Congruence: Measurement, 
Development, and Relevance for Political Representation. In How Democracy 
Works?, ed. Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts, 39-54. Amsterdam: 
Pallas Publications – Amsterdam University Press. 
Aristotle. 1962. The Politics of Aristotle, ed. and trans. by Ernest Barker. New 
York: Oxford University Press.  
Bachrach, Peter. 1967. The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company. 
Beard, Charles A., and John D. Lewis. 1959. Representative Government in 
Evolution. In Legislative Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research, ed. John 
C. Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, 23-30. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press. 
Best, Heinrich, György Lengyel, and Luca Verzichelli. 2012. The Europe of Elites: 
A Study into the Europeanness of Europe's Political and Economic Elites. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Dalton, Russell J. 1985. Political Parties and Political Representation: Party 
Supporters and Party Elites in Nine Nations. In Comparative Political Studies 18 
(3): 267-99.  
Dalton, Russell J., David M. Farrell, and Ian McAllister. 2011. The Dynamics of 
Political Representation. In How Democracy Works?, ed. Martin Rosema, Bas 
Denters and Kees Aarts, 21-38. Amsterdam: Pallas Publications – Amsterdam 
University Press. 
Dalton, Russell J. 2015. Party Representation Across Multiple Issue Dimensions. 
Party Politics 23 (6): 609-22. 
Dumont, Patrick, Jan Fivaz, and Daniel Schwarz. 2017. The Elite-Voter Gap 
Revisited. Paper presented at the ECPR General Conference, September 6-9, in 
Oslo, Norway.  
Disch, Lisa. 2011. Toward a Mobilization Conception of Political Representation. 
The American Political Science Review 105 (1): 102-14. 
Esmer, Yilmaz. 2013. Democracy, Civil Society and Islam. In Religion and Civil 
Society in Europe, ed. Joep de Hart, Paul Dekker and Loek Halman, 267-84. 
Dordrecht, Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer. 
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission). 2009. 
Report On the Imperative Mandate and Similar Practices. June 16, in Strasbourg, 
France. 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  326 
Fuchs, Dieter, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 1990. The Left-Right Schema. In 
Continuities in Political Action: A Longitudinal Study of Political Orientations in 
Three Western Democracies, ed. M. Kent Jennings and Jan W. van Deth, 203-34. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Fuchs, Dieter. 2007. The Political Culture Paradigm. In The Oxford Handbook of 
Political Behaviour, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Hans‐Dieter Klingemann, 161-84. 
New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Golder, Matt, and Jacek Stramski. 2010, January. Ideological Congruence and 
Electoral Institutions. American Journal of Political Science 54 (1): 90-106. 
Higley, John. 2006. Democracy and Elites. Comparative Social Research 23: 
<https://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1016/S0195-6310%2806% 
2923010-2> (Accessed April, 15, 2018). 
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2006. Methodological Developments in Elite Research. 
Paper presented at the 20th IPSA World Congress, July 9-14, in Fukuoka, Japan. 
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2007. Methods of Elite Research. In The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann, 910-27. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2008. Studying Elite vs Mass Opinion. In The Sage 
Handbook of Public Opinion Research, ed. Wolfgang Donsbach and Michael W. 
Traugott, 53-63. Los Angeles: Sage Publications. 
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2010. The Salience of the Socio-Economic Cleavage. In 
Democracy Under Scrutiny: Elites, Citizens, Cultures, ed. Ursula J. van Beek, 
173-200. Opladen, Farmington Hills, MI: Barbara Budrich Publishers. 
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2016. Parliamentarians Perceptions and Evaluations of 
the Global Economic Crisis. Paper presented at the 15th Seminar “Sociological 
Problems of Power Institutions Under Conditions of Russian Transformation”, 
Nov. 10-12, St. Petersburg, Russia.  
Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. 2018. Parliamentarians’ Evaluations of the Global Eco-
nomic Crisis. Historical Social Research 43 (4): 175-202. doi: 10.12759/hsr.43. 
2018.4.175-202. 
Holmberg, Sören. 2011. Dynamic Representation from Above. In How Democracy 
Works?, ed. Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts, 53-76. Amsterdam: 
Pallas Publications – Amsterdam University Press. 
Huber, John D., and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1994. Congruence Between Citizens 
and Policymakers in Two Visions of Liberal Democracy. World Politics 46 (3): 
291-326.  
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change 
and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Richard Stoess, and Bernhard Weßels, eds. 1991. 
Politische Klasse und Politische Institutionen. Probleme and Perspektiven der 
Elitenforschung, 259-74. Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag.  
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1999. Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global 
Analysis. In Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, ed. 
Pippa Norris, 31-56. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, Darina Gancheva, and Bernhard Weßels. 2017. 
Ideological Congruence: Choice, Visibility and Clarity. In Parties, Governments 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  327 
and Elites, ed. Philipp Harfst, Ina Kubbe and Thomas Poguntke, 53-72. 
Wiesbaden: Springer VS.  
Kurland, Philip B., and Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987. Edmund Burke, Speech to the 
Electors of Bristol. In The Founders’ Constitution. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press <http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch13s7. 
html> (Accessed April 6, 2018). 
Landemore, Hélène. 2016. Rousseau’s Mistake: Representation and the Myth of 
Direct Democracy. Paper presented at Berkeley University, April 15, in 
California, USA. 
Listhaug, Ola, and Matti Wiberg. 1995. Confidence in Political and Private 
Institutions. In Citizens and the State, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter 
Fuchs, 298-322. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mansbridge, Jane. 2003. Rethinking Representation. The American Political 
Science Review 97 (4): 515-28.  
Miller, Warren E., and Donald E. Stokes. 1963. Constituency Influence in 
Congress. The American Political ScienceReview 57 (1), <https://www. 
jstor.org/stable/pdf/1952717.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab1e1f00f04898ab1e0b45
4a4e7b0e946> (Accessed April 16, 2018).  
Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York, Oxford: The Oxford 
University Press. 
Otero-Felipe, Patricia, and Juan A. Rodriquez-Zepeda. 2010. Measuring 
Representation in Latin America: A Study of the Ideological Congruence 
Between Parties and Voters. Paper presented at the 106th annual meeting of the 
American Political Science Association, September 2-5, in Washington DC, 
USA.  
Pettersson, Thorleif. 2010. Pro-Democratic Orientations, Political Shortcuts and 
Policy Issues. In Democracy Under Scrutiny: Elites, Citizens, Cultures, ed. 
Ursula J. van Beek, 117-46. Opladen, Farmington Hills, MI: Barbara Budrich 
Publishers. 
Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr, and Georg S. Vanberg. 2000. Election Laws, 
Disproportionality and the Left-Right Dimension. British Journal of Political 
Science 30: 383-411. 
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2009. The Ideological Congruence Controversy: The 
Impact of Alternative Measures, Data and Time Periods on the Effects of 
Election Results. Comparative Political Studies 42 (12): 1475-97.  
Powell, G. Bingham, Jr. 2013. Representation in Context: Election Laws and 
Ideological Congruence Between Citizens and Governments. Perspectives on 
Politics 11 (1): 9-21. 
Rehfeld, Andrew. 2009. Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and 
Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation And Democracy. The 
American Political Science Review 103 (2): 214-30.  
Rosema, Martin, Kees Aarts, and Bas Denters. 2011. How Democracy Works? 
Amsterdam: Pallas Publications – Amsterdam University Press. 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1953 [1762]. The Social Contract. In Jean Jacques 
Rousseau: Political Writings, ed. and trans. by Frederick Watkins. New York: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons.  
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  328 
Sabl, Andrew. 2015. The Two Cultures of Democratic Theory: Responsiveness, 
Democratic Quality, and the Empirical-Normative Divide. Perspectives on 
Politics 13 (2): 345-65. 
Thomassen, Jacques. 1991. Empirical Research into Political Representation: A 
Critical Reappraisal. In  Politische Klasse und Politische Institutionen. Probleme 
and Perspektiven der Elitenforschung, ed. Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Richard 
Stoess, and Bernhard Weßels, 259-74. Opladen:Westdeutscher Verlag. 
Thomassen, Jacques. 2012. The Blind Corner of Political Representation. 
Representation 48 (1): 13-27. 
Van der Hulst, Marc. 2000. The Parliamentary Mandate: A Global Comparative 
Study. Geneva: Inter-Parliamentary Union.  
Welzel, Christian, and Hans-Dieter Klingemann. 2011. Democratic Congruence Re-
Established: The Perspective of ‘Substantive’ Democracy. In How Democracy 
Works?, ed. Martin Rosema, Bas Denters and Kees Aarts, 89-114. Amsterdam: 
Pallas Publications – Amsterdam University Press. 
Weßels, Bernhard. 2007. Political Representation and Democracy. In The Oxford 
Handbook of Political Behavior, eds. Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter 
Klingemann, 833-49. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
  
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  329 
Appendix 
Figure 1: Overall Overlap of Left-Right Ideological Distributions, 2013 (%) 
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Figure 2: Overlap of Left-Right Ideological Distributions: Parties and Their 
Supporters, 2013 (%) 
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Figure 3: Overall Overlap of Policy Distributions, 2013 (%) 
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Figure 4: Overlap of Policy Distributions: Parties and Their Supporters, 2013 (%) 
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Figure 5: Overall Overlap of Distributions of Democratic Values, 2013 (%) 
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Figure 6: Overlap of Distributions of Democratic Values: Parties and Their 
Supporters, 2013 (%) 
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